
Why We Still Elect Sheriffs but Hire City Managers: A Political Legacy Explained
For most voters, local elections can feel like a patchwork of names and titles - a sheriff here, a city clerk there, and a city manager you’ve probably never voted for. But this uneven map of accountability isn’t random; it’s a reflection of centuries-old ideas about democracy, power, and trust in government. From the post-Revolutionary push for citizen control to the Progressive Era’s obsession with professionalism, the story of who we elect versus who we appoint reveals how history continues to script modern local governance. And understanding that story can change the way we think about democracy at its most intimate level - in our own hometowns
The pattern of electing certain public officials while appointing others is deeply rooted in historical traditions that date back to the early formation of American local government. Offices like Sheriff, County Clerk, and Tax Assessor were originally designed to be directly accountable to the electorate, reflecting the democratic values held during the post-Revolutionary period. These roles have persisted as elected positions largely due to voter familiarity and legal precedent, rather than through any deliberate policy analysis or modern efficiency argument. Their continued election reflects a longstanding belief that certain functions - especially those involving law enforcement or fiscal oversight - should be directly answerable to the public through the ballot box.
In contrast, positions like City Manager, Fire Marshal, and Planning Director typically emerged after the Progressive Era, when local governments began adopting administrative reforms aimed at efficiency and professionalism. These roles were intentionally designed to be appointed or hired, often requiring technical expertise or specialized training. The shift toward appointment was a response to concerns about patronage, corruption, and the limitations of direct democracy in complex administrative matters. As a result, offices created in more recent decades are typically structured as professional positions, filled through competitive hiring to prioritize qualifications over political appeal. This structural divergence has created the appearance of inconsistency, when in fact it reflects different eras of public administration philosophy.
The Impact of the Progressive Era on Administrative Structures
The Progressive Movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries played a major role in reshaping local government structures. Reformers advocated for a more professional and less politicized local government, which led to the creation of systems like the council-manager form of government. Under this structure, elected officials such as city council members retain policymaking authority, while day-to-day operations are managed by an appointed City Manager. This model was designed to reduce political interference in administrative decisions and to ensure continuity and expertise in service delivery, especially in growing urban areas (Svara 1990)1.
The influence of this model continues today in many local jurisdictions, where technical positions such as public works director, city planner, and fire chief are appointed by the city manager or governing body. These roles demand specific certifications, continuing education, and operational knowledge that are not easily evaluated through a political campaign. The distinction between elected and appointed roles is thus not arbitrary, but rather reflects a deliberate effort to align responsibilities with the appropriate selection mechanism, balancing democratic accountability with administrative competence (Nalbandian 2006)2.
Public Expectations and Confusion About Accountability
From a practical standpoint, the general public often does not distinguish between elected and appointed officials in terms of who holds decision-making power. This creates confusion about accountability and authority in local government. For example, residents may assume the Fire Marshal is an elected official because of the visibility and perceived autonomy of the role. When they find out that the position is appointed by a city council or manager, questions about responsiveness and transparency frequently arise. The same misunderstanding can occur when a City Manager makes administrative decisions that are unpopular, even though the manager is not directly elected by the public.
This confusion can hamper civic engagement and reduce trust in local government. To address this issue, jurisdictions can take proactive steps to clarify the roles and selection processes of their officials. Regular public briefings, clearly written organizational charts, and educational outreach efforts can help constituents understand which offices are elected, which are appointed, and why those systems are in place. Transparency about these structures is essential for maintaining public confidence and ensuring that citizens know how to effectively influence local governance (Kettl 2015)3.
The Debate Over Returning to Elected Positions
Some advocates argue that more local government positions should return to being elected, citing the principle of direct democracy and the need for public accountability. This perspective is particularly strong in rural areas or smaller communities where residents feel closely connected to their local officials and want a direct say in who occupies key offices. In these settings, electing officials is seen as a safeguard against bureaucratic overreach and a tool for ensuring local values are reflected in government operations (DeSantis and Renner 2002)4.
However, broadening the number of elected positions raises concerns about voter fatigue, ballot complexity, and the politicization of technical functions. Many voters already struggle to make informed decisions in elections involving judicial, school board, and special district candidates. Reintroducing elections for positions that require specific expertise could dilute the quality of governance and politicize roles that function more effectively under professional management. Policymakers must weigh these trade-offs carefully, considering both democratic ideals and the practical requirements of delivering public services efficiently and effectively.
Practical Guidance for Local Governments
Practitioners working in local government should periodically evaluate the structure of their organization to ensure it aligns with both modern administrative standards and community expectations. This includes reviewing which positions are elected, appointed, or hired, and considering whether those choices still serve the jurisdiction’s goals. For example, if an appointed official consistently garners public attention or controversy, it may be worth assessing whether the community would prefer that role to be elected. Conversely, if an elected official lacks the qualifications needed to manage complex programs, converting the role to an appointed position may better serve the public interest.
Any proposed changes to the status of an office - from elected to appointed or vice versa - should be approached with care. This process typically requires charter amendments, public hearings, and extensive stakeholder engagement. Clear communication, inclusive dialogue, and evidence-based reasoning are essential to gaining community support. Ultimately, the goal should be to strike a balance between democratic accountability and administrative efficiency, ensuring that each public office is structured in a way that best serves its purpose and meets the expectations of the community it represents.
Bibliography
Svara, James H. 1990. Official Leadership in the City: Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nalbandian, John. 2006. "Politics and Administration in Local Government." International Journal of Public Administration 29(12): 1049-1063.
Kettl, Donald F. 2015. Politics of the Administrative Process. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
DeSantis, Victor S., and Tari Renner. 2002. "City Government Structures: An Attempt at Clarification." State and Local Government Review 34(2): 95-104.
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