COVID Money Is Gone. Why Are Cities Still Spending Like It Isn't?

From Albany and Schenectady to Buffalo, Philadelphia, and Chicago, municipal governments are confronting the consequences of temporary federal funding, unsustainable operating costs, and inadequate long-term financial planning. Borrowing more money, raising taxes, and requesting another bailout will not fix a structural deficit.
By Scott Webber | CityGov | November 2026
The financial crises confronting Albany, Schenectady, and numerous other American municipalities were not entirely unforeseeable. In many cases, they reflect a fundamental failure of government financial management: spending temporary revenues as though they would continue indefinitely.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress provided state and local governments with unprecedented financial assistance through the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). These funds helped municipalities stabilize services, offset revenue losses, and respond to extraordinary public health and economic challenges.
But the funding was always temporary.
Municipal officials knew when the federal assistance would expire. They knew that permanent employees, recurring contracts, fringe benefits, and ordinary operating expenses would continue long after those funds were depleted.
Yet some governments failed to establish sustainable spending levels or develop credible plans to replace temporary revenues.
Now, with federal pandemic assistance largely exhausted, taxpayers are being asked to shoulder the consequences through higher property taxes, additional borrowing, depleted reserves, and requests for extraordinary state assistance.
The problem is neither unique to New York's Capital Region nor confined to financially distressed older cities.
According to the National League of Cities' 2025 State of the Cities Report, 69% of surveyed mayors anticipated that the expiration of ARPA funding would negatively affect municipal budgets or city management.
That finding should concern every taxpayer.
It suggests that the financial difficulties now confronting Albany and Schenectady are part of a much broader national challenge. But it also raises a troubling question: Why did so many governments fail to adequately prepare for a funding cliff they knew was coming?
Albany: A preventable fiscal crisis
Albany offers one of New York State's clearest examples of what happens when unrealistic revenue assumptions and inadequate financial oversight become embedded in municipal budgeting.
On September 30, 2026, the New York State Comptroller released an independent review of Albany's adopted 2025 and 2026 budgets.
The findings were alarming.
The city experienced an approximately $25 million unplanned operating deficit in 2025. The Comptroller also identified substantial weaknesses in the city's 2026 budget, including unreasonable revenue and expenditure estimates.
Perhaps most troubling, Albany budgeted revenue from pandemic funding that no longer existed.
The city had received approximately $80.7 million in ARPA assistance, which was exhausted by the end of 2024. Nevertheless, officials included another $2 million in ARPA revenues in the 2025 budget and $1 million in 2026.
As the Times Union reported in its October 2026 coverage of the State Comptroller's findings, Albany had effectively incorporated millions of dollars in nonexistent federal assistance into its financial plans.
This was not merely a forecasting error caused by unexpected inflation or changing economic conditions.
It was a basic failure to reconcile budgeted revenues against available funding.
A separate audit of Albany's $25 million Albany for All initiative identified additional deficiencies in the management of pandemic-funded commitments, including potentially millions of dollars in budget shortfalls and outstanding obligations.
These findings demand serious scrutiny of Albany's financial management and the procedures used to develop, review, and approve its budgets.
Government budget offices are expected to maintain accurate records of revenues, expenditures, contractual commitments, and grant balances. Those responsibilities are fundamental to public administration.
If officials cannot reliably determine whether an appropriation is supported by available funding, the integrity of the entire budget process is undermined.
Albany's fiscal difficulties have also prompted consideration of short-term borrowing to meet operating obligations.
Borrowing is not inherently inappropriate. Municipalities may legitimately issue revenue anticipation notes to manage temporary timing differences between expenditures and expected collections.
But borrowing to address a persistent structural operating deficit is another matter.
Debt does not create new operating revenue. It postpones repayment and may increase future financial obligations.
A government cannot borrow its way to structural balance any more than a household can sustainably finance recurring living expenses through an ever-expanding credit line.
Schenectady: Replacing a tax increase with uncertain state aid
Schenectady's 2027 budget presents a different but related concern.
Mayor Gary McCarthy initially proposed an extraordinary property tax levy increase of approximately 43%, reflecting the city's substantial financial pressures.
The City Council ultimately adopted a budget with an approximately 14% levy increase.
At first glance, reducing the proposed increase by nearly two-thirds might appear to be a significant victory for taxpayers.
But the underlying financing assumptions tell a more complicated story.
According to WAMC's November 6, 2026, report on Schenectady's adopted budget, lawmakers reduced the proposed tax increase partly by assuming approximately $6.5 million in additional state assistance that had not been secured.
The adopted plan also included increased sales tax projections and approximately $1.7 million in expenditure reductions.
The spending cuts represent an actual budgetary adjustment. The anticipated state assistance, however, remains contingent on decisions outside the city's control.
This is precisely the distinction municipal officials must make.
If a government assumes additional state revenue before that assistance has been appropriated, it risks creating the appearance of a balanced budget without establishing that the necessary resources will actually materialize.
As the Times Union explained in its coverage of Schenectady's budget adoption, the city is effectively depending on favorable future state action.
That is not a sustainable substitute for addressing recurring expenditures.
Schenectady should immediately identify which expenditures would be reduced if the anticipated state funding does not arrive. It should also independently validate its sales tax assumptions and publish a multiyear plan explaining how the city intends to avoid repeating the same fiscal difficulties.
Taxpayers should not have to wait until a projected revenue source fails to materialize before discovering that the adopted budget was never financially secure.
A troubling personnel connection between Albany and Schenectady County
The accountability questions surrounding Albany's budget crisis extend beyond the city's current leadership.
Gideon Grande served as Albany's budget director during the preparation of budgets subsequently criticized by the State Comptroller.
He resigned in March 2026 as details of Albany's financial problems were emerging.
Months later, Grande was hired as director of management and budget for Schenectady County.
The Times Union documented the appointment in an October 7, 2026, investigation, reporting that county officials were aware of the controversy surrounding Grande's previous tenure but defended their decision to hire him.
An important distinction must be made: Grande works for Schenectady County, not the City of Schenectady. These are separate governments with distinct budgets and financial responsibilities.
Furthermore, Albany's financial crisis cannot automatically be attributed to a single employee. Budget directors prepare financial plans, but mayors, commissioners, comptrollers, auditors, and legislative bodies also bear responsibility for financial oversight and budget adoption.
Nevertheless, the appointment raises legitimate questions about accountability and public-sector hiring practices.
When an official responsible for preparing budgets later found to contain materially unreasonable assumptions moves into another senior municipal finance position, taxpayers are entitled to ask what due diligence was performed.
What explanation was provided for the prior budgeting deficiencies? Were independent references obtained? What safeguards were established to ensure that the same practices would not recur?
These are reasonable governance questions, not personal accusations.
It would be premature to conclude that Schenectady County will experience comparable fiscal problems merely because it hired a former Albany official.
But it would be equally unreasonable to suggest that documented failures in a prospective employee's prior area of responsibility deserve no particular scrutiny.
Government should evaluate financial executives not simply on their credentials or years of experience, but on their demonstrated ability to prepare accurate budgets, maintain effective internal controls, and protect public resources.
Without that standard, accountability becomes little more than a slogan.
Troy: A useful comparison, but not immune to financial pressures
Troy presents a more favorable financial picture than Albany or Schenectady.
In October 2026, Mayor Carmella Mantello proposed a 2027 budget of approximately $130 million, including a 3.4% property tax increase.
According to the City of Troy's official 2027 budget announcement, the proposed budget remained within the state property tax cap and incorporated measures intended to maintain fiscal stability.
The administration has also reported budget surpluses and the maintenance of financial reserves.
As WAMC noted in its October 11 report, Troy's financial position contrasts with the much more severe fiscal difficulties confronting nearby municipalities.
That distinction matters.
Troy should not be labeled as experiencing the same degree of fiscal distress as Albany simply because all three cities face rising costs, aging infrastructure, and significant tax-exempt property.
Nevertheless, reported surpluses do not eliminate the need for scrutiny.
Residents should examine whether projected revenues are realistic, whether reserves are sufficient, whether infrastructure obligations are properly funded, and whether recurring expenditures remain sustainable.
Troy's proposed hiring restrictions and other expenditure controls may offer useful lessons, provided they produce measurable savings without undermining essential services.
Its comparatively stronger financial position also demonstrates that the Capital Region's economic and tax-base challenges do not automatically produce identical municipal outcomes.
Buffalo: The same problem on a larger scale
Anyone inclined to dismiss Albany's difficulties as a uniquely local failure should consider Buffalo.
On May 8, 2026, the New York State Comptroller issued a budget review identifying a projected $103 million general fund deficit in Buffalo's proposed 2026–27 budget.
The Comptroller directly attributed part of the city's financial difficulties to its historical reliance on nonrecurring revenues to support ongoing operations and its tendency to underestimate expenditures.
These findings closely resemble the underlying fiscal management concerns in Albany.
Buffalo benefited from substantial federal pandemic assistance, which helped sustain municipal operations during and after the public health emergency.
But temporary funding did not eliminate the need to control recurring expenditures or identify sustainable replacement revenues.
The Comptroller's accompanying public statement made clear that the city's budget assumptions warranted serious concern.
Buffalo's experience provides powerful evidence that this is not simply a Capital Region problem.
It is a broader failure to distinguish temporary financial relief from permanent fiscal capacity.
Philadelphia: A $1.4 billion temporary cushion
Philadelphia offers one of the nation's most instructive comparisons.
The city received approximately $1.4 billion in ARPA assistance, which helped offset operating deficits over several fiscal years.
In a November 12, 2026, analysis, The Pew Charitable Trusts warned that Philadelphia's budget forecasts required more intentional planning.
Pew noted that the federal assistance helped bridge budget gaps from fiscal years 2021 through 2025, temporarily buffering the city against financial pressures that would eventually reemerge.
A separate Pew analysis of Philadelphia's post-ARPA fiscal outlook had warned years earlier that financial reserves could decline substantially after pandemic funding expired.
Philadelphia therefore illustrates a key point: even when temporary federal assistance was used for legally permissible purposes, it could delay necessary decisions about recurring expenditures and long-term revenue capacity.
Extraordinary funding should have created an opportunity to implement structural improvements.
Instead, in many jurisdictions, it postponed the political and administrative consequences of fiscal imbalance.
Chicago: Another example of structural deficits and temporary solutions
Chicago's financial challenges are substantially larger and more complicated than those of most upstate New York municipalities.
The city faces significant pension obligations, debt-service costs, and recurring expenditure pressures.
In September 2026, WBEZ reported that Chicago projected an $882.4 million budget deficit for 2027.
The city's predicament cannot be attributed exclusively to the expiration of pandemic assistance. Long-standing pension liabilities and structural revenue challenges predate COVID-19.
However, Chicago demonstrates the dangers of relying on temporary or uncertain financing measures while recurring obligations continue to grow.
Whether a government attempts to close an operating gap through debt refinancing, one-time asset proceeds, extraordinary assistance, or speculative revenue projections, the basic financial problem remains.
If recurring expenditures continue to exceed recurring revenues, the structural deficit survives.
Deferring difficult decisions does not eliminate their cost.
It generally increases the burden facing future taxpayers.
This is a nationwide issue, not simply a Capital Region failure
The experiences of Albany, Schenectady, Buffalo, Philadelphia, and Chicago reflect a larger national transition.
According to the National League of Cities' September 2025 analysis of how municipalities were preparing for the end of ARPA funding, many local governments anticipated significant budgetary consequences as federal assistance expired.
The National League of Cities' 2025 State of the Cities Report found that 69% of surveyed mayors expected negative consequences from the expiration of that assistance.
This does not establish that 69% of municipalities mismanaged federal funds. Nor does it mean that every city experiencing a deficit acted irresponsibly.
Governments face genuine economic pressures, including inflation, higher employee benefit costs, infrastructure deterioration, and changing local revenue patterns.
Some municipalities also used ARPA assistance prudently for temporary expenditures, capital improvements, and economic recovery initiatives that did not create significant new recurring obligations.
But the broader findings establish that the expiration of extraordinary federal assistance is a significant national municipal finance challenge.
They also underscore why cities should have adopted explicit exit strategies before committing temporary funds to activities requiring ongoing support.
The lesson is straightforward: Temporary financial assistance should never be mistaken for permanent fiscal capacity.
The tax-exempt property problem: A structural disadvantage, not a blank check
Older upstate New York cities face a substantial challenge that many suburban and rapidly growing municipalities do not: a large share of their property is exempt from taxation.
Albany is particularly disadvantaged because it serves as New York's state capital and hosts substantial government, educational, healthcare, and nonprofit facilities.
In 2022 testimony to the New York State Legislature, former Albany Mayor Kathy Sheehan reported that approximately 64% of Albany's property value was tax-exempt.
The same presentation identified approximately 46% in Troy and 38% in Schenectady.
More recent official data are available in the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance's 2025 property tax exemption report. These figures must be evaluated according to the valuation and exemption definitions used rather than treated as interchangeable measures.
Regardless of methodology, the underlying problem is undeniable.
Tax-exempt institutions may impose costs on municipal infrastructure, emergency services, streets, and other public resources without producing conventional property tax revenue comparable to fully taxable private property.
This means that governments must finance many essential services from a relatively limited taxable base.
Attempting to close recurring operating deficits through repeated property tax increases can therefore place an increasingly disproportionate burden on homeowners, landlords, and businesses.
The result can be higher housing costs, reduced private investment, and diminished long-term economic competitiveness.
New York State should seriously reevaluate payments in lieu of taxes, state aid formulas, and other mechanisms for compensating municipalities that host substantial amounts of state-owned property.
But an inequitable tax base does not excuse unrealistic budgets.
Even if Albany received more equitable state compensation, city officials would still have a responsibility to accurately forecast revenues, control expenditures, maintain reserves, and disclose long-term financial obligations.
Structural disadvantages explain why municipal budgeting is difficult. They do not justify budgeting revenues that do not exist.
Seven reforms municipalities should implement before asking taxpayers for more money
The solution is not simply to borrow more, raise taxes, or hope state government provides another emergency appropriation.
It is to restore sound financial management.
1. Reestablish sustainable pre-pandemic operating baselines
Every municipality should reconstruct its 2019 operating budget, adjust it for documented inflation, contractual obligations, and changes in service demand, and compare that normalized baseline with current recurring expenditures.
The objective should not be an arbitrary return to 2019 nominal spending. It should be identifying expenditures introduced or expanded with temporary assistance that cannot now be supported by recurring revenues.
Programs without sustainable funding should be reduced, consolidated, redesigned, or discontinued when justified by an examination of their costs and outcomes.
2. Require independent validation of budget assumptions
Major revenue assumptions should be reviewed by personnel or entities independent of those preparing the executive budget.
Sales tax forecasts should be supported by historical collections and defensible economic assumptions.
State assistance should not be treated as guaranteed until there is a reliable legal or budgetary basis for expecting the funds.
Where uncertain revenues are included, municipalities should establish contingency reductions that take effect if those revenues fail to materialize.
3. Mandate rolling five-year financial plans
Annual balanced budgets are insufficient when governments enter into multiyear labor contracts, pension obligations, technology agreements, borrowing arrangements, and capital commitments.
Every municipality should publish a rolling five-year financial plan distinguishing recurring revenues, recurring expenditures, one-time funding sources, reserves, and projected structural deficits.
Those plans should be updated quarterly based on actual financial results.
4. Conduct independent operational and staffing reviews
Before increasing taxes, municipal officials should demonstrate that they have evaluated opportunities to reduce costs.
Such reviews should examine overtime, staffing, vacancies, procurement contracts, fleet operations, information technology expenditures, administrative overhead, and the potential for intermunicipal shared services.
The goal should not be indiscriminate reductions that compromise public safety or essential services.
It should be measurable operational efficiency supported by documented analysis.
5. Prohibit routine dependence on borrowing for operating deficits
Borrowing should principally support eligible long-term capital improvements or legitimate short-term cash-flow management needs.
Recurring operating expenses should ordinarily be financed through recurring revenues.
Municipalities should establish formal reserve requirements and publicly disclose the financial consequences of using fund balances or debt to support ordinary operations.
A balanced budget that depends on continuously depleting reserves is not necessarily a sustainable budget.
6. Expand the taxable base rather than endlessly increasing tax rates
Albany, Troy, Schenectady, and similarly situated municipalities should pursue sustainable economic development, review tax exemptions and incentive arrangements, and seek appropriate compensation for state-owned property.
Development incentives should be evaluated based on documented fiscal benefits rather than speculative projections.
The objective should be long-term expansion of taxable economic activity, reducing the concentration of municipal costs on existing taxpayers.
7. Establish meaningful accountability for financial management failures
Budget officials and elected leaders should be evaluated against measurable financial management standards.
These should include forecasting accuracy, timely financial reporting, compliance with funding restrictions, audit findings, expenditure controls, and the timely implementation of corrective actions.
Material deficiencies should trigger documented independent reviews and corrective-action plans.
Where evidence establishes negligence, misconduct, or other serious performance failures, appropriate administrative or legal consequences should follow established procedures.
Public officials should not be insulated from scrutiny simply because the financial consequences of their decisions become apparent after they leave office.
State bailouts should come with enforceable conditions
There are legitimate circumstances in which state assistance is necessary.
Cities hosting substantial state-owned property may have weaker tax bases than neighboring municipalities. Other communities face significant socioeconomic challenges, aging infrastructure, and state-mandated expenditures.
Those disadvantages deserve appropriate consideration in state aid formulas.
But extraordinary financial assistance should not become a mechanism for perpetually subsidizing unsustainable budgets.
Additional state assistance should be accompanied by independently reviewed financial plans, realistic revenue projections, expenditure controls, reserve requirements, and measurable progress toward structural balance.
The purpose of financial intervention should be to restore fiscal stability, not merely postpone the next crisis.
Municipalities that maintain reasonable spending discipline should not be disadvantaged relative to governments that repeatedly depend on emergency assistance.
Accountability should accompany public funding.
The bottom line: The funding cliff was foreseeable
The expiration of pandemic assistance did not occur without warning.
Local officials had years to evaluate their financial commitments, identify recurring obligations, develop replacement funding plans, and adjust spending before federal resources disappeared.
Albany's documented budgeting deficiencies illustrate what can happen when that responsibility is neglected.
Schenectady's reliance on uncertain state assistance illustrates the continued appeal of balancing budgets around revenues that have not yet materialized.
Buffalo's projected $103 million deficit demonstrates that the problem extends well beyond the Capital Region.
Philadelphia and Chicago show that even much larger governments face serious consequences when temporary financial relief interacts with persistent structural expenditure pressures.
Troy, meanwhile, presents a useful reminder that municipalities facing similar regional challenges do not necessarily experience identical fiscal outcomes.
Not every city confronting a deficit has been mismanaged. But every city has an obligation to prepare accurate budgets, control expenditures, plan for foreseeable revenue changes, and explain its financial decisions to taxpayers.
Tax increases may sometimes be necessary. State assistance may sometimes be appropriate. Short-term borrowing may occasionally serve a legitimate purpose.
None of those measures should substitute for competent financial management.
The essential question is not whether government can find enough money to balance the next budget on paper.
It is whether government can operate sustainably without repeatedly demanding that taxpayers finance the consequences of unrealistic assumptions and inadequate planning.
The federal pandemic money was temporary. The responsibility to manage public finances competently was not.
Until municipal governments recognize that distinction, taxpayers will continue paying for financial decisions they did not make—and failures they should not be expected to subsidize.






Join the discussion
Members can read and add comments on every article.